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ARTICLES
THE NEXT CHALLENGE FOR THE FIRST




The Internet' has rapidly emerged as arguably the most powerful
communication tool in society, empowering people to exchange ideas
and information with others across the globe with great ease and for very
little cost.' One court characterized the Internet as "the most
participatory marketplace of mass speech that this country - and indeed
the world - has yet seen."3 The number of Internet users has doubled
every year since 1993,4 and today has burgeoned to approximately 200
+ Law Clerk, The Honorable D. Barrington Parker, Jr. (Second Circuit) 2001-2002;
Prospective Law Clerk, The Honorable Robert A. Katzmann (Second Circuit) 2002-2003.
J.D., Yale Law School, 2001. I am indebted to Sterling Professor of Law, Owen M. Fiss, of
the Yale Law School, for his invaluable insight and constructive comments on various
drafts of this Article. I also thank Dan Deane, Angela Pegram, and the rest of the staff of
the Catholic University Law Review for their superb editorial assistance. Any errors, of
course, are attributable solely to the author.
1. The Internet has been described as a large environment, composed of "a
patchwork of thousands of smaller networks across the world." Michael Johns, Comment,
The First Amendment and Cyberspace. Trying To Teach Old Doctrines New Tricks, 64 U.
CIN. L. REv. 1383, 1383 n.7 (1996) (citing DOUGLAS E. COMER, THE INTERNET BOOK
69-70 (1994)). These networks communicate with each other by employing a consistent
suite of software protocols. Id.
2. Sally Greenberg, Threats, Harassment, and Hate On-line: Recent Developments, 6
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 673, 673 (1997) ("The Internet allows people to connect with others
around the world to exchange ideas and information for very little cost."); Johns, supra
note 1 at 1384 ("[Clyberspace represents the new frontier for unparalleled freedom of
expression.") (citing HOWARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY:
HOMESTEADING ON THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 14 (1993)).
3. Reno v. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. 824, 881 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
4. Sarah B. Hogan, Note, To Net or Not to Net.- Singapore's Regulation of the
Internet, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 429, 432 (1999) (citing Arul Louis, Answernet, DAILY NEWS,
Oct. 27, 1996, at 46).
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million worldwide,5 with more than half of American homes having
6
Internet access. These individuals can post opinions and responses to
thousands of public bulletin boards7 and can create Web sites that reach
out to a new and vast audience.8 Advocacy groups who formerly were
limited to disseminating their messages primarily through verbal
channels or through the mail now can enter the lives of many more
individuals by merely a few keystrokes.9
This unprecedented ability to communicate, however, has ushered in
concerns regarding the content of that communication. According to the
Southern Poverty Law Center, a leading monitor of hate speech on the
Internet, the number of Web sites espousing hate speech ballooned from
one in 1995 to 250 in 1999.1° Groups presenting hateful messages now
possess a new forum for discourse that reaches a more vast, and often
more impressionable, audience.1  The Anti-Defamation League is
concerned that young and impressionable individuals will "surf the net"
and uncover hateful sites." Others share the Anti-Defamation League's
concern, fearing that propaganda will indoctrinate the young and inspire
criminal behavior by encouraging hate. 3
How do these new dangers to society mesh with our commitment to
the First Amendment? Free speech has been praised as "one of the most
remarkable aspects of American constitutional law."' 4 On the one hand,
the Internet empowers millions of Americans to participate in new forms
5. Tom Kirchofer, Web Privacy Products Get Notice -- Target Users Wary About
Cyberspace Tracking, BOSTON HERALD, Aug. 13, 2000, at 31; see also Hogan, supra note
4, at 432 (citing Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 831).
6. George A. Chidi, Jr., Survey? 52% of US. Has Home Web Access, NETWORK
WORLD FuSION, Aug. 18,2000, at 1.
7. Johns, supra note 1 at 1383 (citing RHEINGOLD, supra note 2, at 118-25); see also
HARRY NEWTON, NEWTON'S TELECOM DICTIONARY 106 (17th ed. 2001) (defining
bulletin boards).
& See Greenberg, supra note 2, at 673.
9. Id. at 688.
10. Dennis McCafferty, Hate on the Web: Is It Free Speech? Or Does It Incite
Violence?, USA TODAY, Mar. 28, 1999.
11. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 688.
12. Id.
13. See Keith W. Watters, On-Line Racism, NAT'L B. ASS'N MAG., Feb. 10, 1996, at
1; see also Greenberg, supra note 2, at 688.
14. Owen M. Fiss, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY
USES OF STATE POWER 9 (1996); see also, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S.
622, 641 (1994) ("[Elach person should decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs
deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence. Our political system and cultural
life rest upon this ideal."); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (noting that first
Amendment freedoms are "supremely precious in our society").
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of speech, offering an opportunity to expand the "uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open" debate that Justice William Brennan lauded. 5 On the
other hand, the Internet enables individuals to voice hateful and
dangerous messages. 6 The First Amendment's protection of free speech,
however, is not absolute. 7 A small number of expressions fall outside
the bounds of First Amendment protection because of their potential
harm to society, including threats, incitement to lawless action, and child
pornography.18 How do Internet communications fit into the existing
framework of free speech jurisprudence? Herein lies a major challenge
to American society's commitment to the First Amendment, as the
Constitution may protect Web sites and other cyberspace
communications that most people find repulsive in the name of free
speech.9
This Article explores one of the exceptions to the protection of free
speech, incitement to imminent lawless action. The question of
incitement poses a unique problem that is usually absent from free
speech inquiries involving pornography and threats because incitement
often includes the fundamental American value of radical criticism of
government and society? When is such speech permissible, if not
desirable, and when is it unconstitutional? Harry Kalven characterized
this question as "the most important and the most difficult of the First
15. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); see also supra notes 5-6
and accompanying text.
16. Greenberg, supra note 2, at 673.
17. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). The Supreme Court
stated that:
It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the freedom of speech and of
the press which is secured by the Constitution, does not confer an absolute right
to speak or publish, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an
unrestricted and unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of
language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom.
Id.
18. Id. at 667; see also Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110 (1999).
19. Justice Kennedy articulated this challenge in his concurrence in Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397, 420-21 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that the First Amendment
protected the defendant's burning of an American flag during a protest rally). Justice
Kennedy said that "sometimes we must make decisions we do not like. We make them
because they are right, right in the sense that the law and the Constitution, as we see them,
compel the result." Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). It is a well-established tenet of
constitutional law that the distaste we may feel toward the content or message of a
protected expression "cannot . . . detain us from discharging our duty as guardians of the
Constitution." United States v. United States Dist. Ct. for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 858 F.2d
534, 541 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).
20. HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN
AMERICA 120 (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988).
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Amendment issues., 21 Kalven is correct. Incitement brings to life the
most central concerns of censoring speech. On the one hand is the right
of speakers to be free to express their views on controversial subjects; on
the other hand is the basic notion that public order demands that citizens
refrain from illegal activity.22
In the seminal case, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 3 the United States Supreme
Court held that the First Amendment does not protect advocacy that "is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action."' The Brandenburg standard, however,
fails to instruct courts how to handle incitement on the Internet; the
reason for this failure is simple. The Internet introduces a new type of
speaker-audience relationship that makes the current standard
unworkable. The most important prong of the Brandenburg test, the
"imminence requirement," does not work with the vast majority of
Internet communications, as words in cyberspace are usually "heard"
well after they are "spoken." As a result, almost no Internet
communication, regardless of the likelihood and seriousness of
incitement, can be condemned under Brandenburg. How can courts
strike the appropriate balance that addresses the unique dangers posed
by the Internet, yet maintains the Constitution's commitment to a free
and robust exchange of ideas? This question has yet to be answered.
Unlike other free speech inquiries, the Internet implications of the
incitement standards have remained unexplored by both courts and
scholars alike.
This Article strives to fill this constitutional void. The explosion of
Internet messages that may incite individuals to lawless activity demands
the articulation of an Internet incitement standard. The aim of this
Article is to propose a formulation for the incitement standard that
meets the specific demands of cyberspace, yet remains faithful to the
spirit of the Court's decision in Brandenburg.
Part I reviews the current standard for incitement and pays particular
attention to the underlying motivation of courts in developing this
standard. Part I tracks the development of free speech jurisprudence to
identify the spirit of Brandenburg, a spirit that must be kept alive if the
incitement standard is expanded to the Internet. This spirit reveals that
Brandenburg erected a formidable shield for the protection of free
21. Id. at 119.
22. Id. at 119-20.
23. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
24. Id. at 447.
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speech, and subsequent judicial applications of the Brandenburg
standard have maintained this shield.
Part II focuses on Internet incitement. With the proliferation of
hateful postings in cyberspace, the threat of incitement to lawless action
is very real. It is imperative for courts to develop a way to address the
danger of Internet incitement because, as discussed in Part III, the
current standard for incitement does not mesh with the majority of
Internet communications. In fact, under a likely interpretation of
Brandenburg's "imminence requirement," the vast majority of Internet
communication could never be considered incitement, regardless of
content.
Part IV proposes a framework for addressing Internet incitement. Part
IV further posits how to adopt the current standard to cyberspace. The
proposal is careful to preserve the spirit of Brandenburg and not lower
the laudable level of speech protection that Brandenburg constructed. In
particular, this Article identifies the four considerations that are critical
for extending Brandenburg to the Internet and attempts to apply these
factors to recent instances of potential Internet incitement.
I. THE CURRENT INCITEMENT STANDARD
A. Brandenburg v. Ohio
The Supreme Court forged the modem incitement standard in
Brandenburg v. Ohio," a case reviewing the conviction of a Klu Klux
Klan leader under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute26 after he made
several hateful remarks at a televised rally." Reversing his conviction
25. Prior to Brandenburg, the Court had recognized that the right of free speech does
not protect utterances that tend to incite a crime. See, e.g., Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S.
273, 277-78 (1915) (upholding a Washington statute prohibiting inciteful acts to commit a
crime), Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95 (1948) (vacating convictions for conspiring to commit
acts injurious to public morals by counseling, advising, and practicing polygamous or
plural marriage and holding that it was impossible to determine whether convicted on the
grounds that the conspiracy was intended to incite immediate violation of the law). But
see De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 356, 366 (1937) (reversing conviction for violating
the Criminal Syndicalism Law of Oregon and holding that the defendant did not incite to
violence or crime).
26. Brandenberg, 395 U.S. at 444-45 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.13). The
Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute, in pertinent part, criminalized '"advocat[ing] ... the
duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism
as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform' and for 'voluntarily
assembl[ing] with any society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or
advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism."' Id.
27. The speech included statements such as "bury the n******" and "if our President,
our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's
20021
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and striking down the statuteY the Court articulated the incitement
standard:
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do
not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of
force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed
to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action.29
As such, the Court drew a critical distinction between the mere
"advocacy" of violence and "incitement to imminent lawless action."'
Beyond this statement, the Court did not elaborate any further on the
elements of the incitement standard.3 Although a brief, per curiam
opinion, the standard articulated in Brandenburg marked a significant
transformation in free speech jurisprudence.2
B. The "Tortuous Path" from Schenk: Capturing the Spirit of
Brandenburg
To extend Brandenburg to the Internet, it is essential to understand
what the decision actually meant. The true significance of Brandenburg
exceeds the brief text of the opinion.33 To view Brandenburg in a vacuum
would miss the monumental impact of the decision. Brandenburg
represented the culmination of, in the words of Harry Kalven, a
"tortuous path" of free speech jurisprudence. 4
The American free speech tradition has been likened to a shield that
protects the "street corner speaker" who criticizes government policy
from being silenced by the state.35 This tradition began with World War I
cases and came to fruition with Brandenburg, although the current shield
barely resembles that in place in the early 1900s.-6 An examination of
free speech jurisprudence throughout the twentieth century reveals that
the Court has gradually raised the shield to its modern heights.
possible that there might have to be some revengeance taken." Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at
446 & n.1.
28. Id. at 449 (overruling Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 352, 371-72 (1927)).
29. Id. at 447 (citing Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1950)).
30. Id. at 448-49.
31. Id.
32. KALVEN, supra note 20, at 123-24.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 121.
35. Fiss, supra note 14, at 12.
36. Id. at 12-13.
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At the outset of the free speech tradition, the protection of the street
corner speaker was minimal.37  The first major free speech
pronouncement came not from the Supreme Court, but from Judge
Learned Hand in Masses Publication Company v. Patten." Masses
involved an alleged violation of the Espionage Act of 1917,39 legislation
that was concerned with the protection of military secrets and became
the focal point of many World War I free speech cases.4 The conviction
resulted from four political cartoons that appeared in a publication
entitled The Masses.1 Judge Hand articulated an incitement test, but it
was a less formidable incitement test than the one that would later
appear in Brandenburg. Judge Hand focused on the words, paying little
attention to the context, and distinguished between "political agitation"
and "direct incitement to violent resistance." 42 The latter, Judge Hand
contended, cannot be permitted.43
The Supreme Court first addressed First Amendment questions during
World War I, a period when police would arrest the street corner speaker
upon the slightest provocation.4 In 1919, the Court demonstrated a
weak protection of speech in its first major free speech decision ,'
Schenck v. United States.46 At issue was a leaflet that Schenck, a Socialist
Party official, distributed advancing opposition to the war.4" Schenck was
convicted under the Espionage Act for conspiracy to cause
insubordination in the Armed Forces and obstruct the recruitment and
37. See id. at 12.
38. 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917)).
39. The Espionage Act provided:
Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully make or convey false
reports or false statements with intent to interfere with the operation or success
of the military or naval forces of the United States or to promote the success of
its enemies and whoever when the United States is at war, shall willfully cause or
attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the
military or naval forces of the United States, or shall willfully obstruct the
recruiting or enlistment service of the United States, to the injury of the service
or of the United States, shall be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or
imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both.
Id. at 536 (quoting Espionage Act).
40. See KALVEN, supra note 20, at 126.
41. Id.
42. Masses, 244 F. at 540.
43. Id.
44. See Fiss, supra note 14, at 12.
45. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951) ("No important case involving
free speech was decided by this Court prior to Schenck v. United States.").
46. 249 U.S. 47,49-52 (1919).
47. Id. at 49-51.
2002]
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enlistment of services.0 In reviewing Schenck's conviction, Justice
Holmes articulated what has become known as the "clear and present
danger" test.49 Justice Holmes summarized the test as follows:
The question in every case is whether the words used are used
in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a
question of proximity and degree.5"
The Court held that Schenck's leaflet constituted a clear and present
danger, therefore it fell outside the scope of First Amendment
protection.5'
To understand the token protection of free speech that existed at this
time, one need only look at the innocuous language of Schenck's leaflet.
The leaflet merely advocated that citizens exercise their right to assert
opposition to the draft. 5' The most strongly worded part53 stated, "Will
you let cunning politicians and a mercenary capitalist press wrongly and
untruthfully mould your thoughts? Do not forget your right to elect
officials who are opposed to conscription."' 4 In the eyes of the Court,
these words constituted a clear and present danger that warranted
censorship, notwithstanding the First Amendment. 55  As Kalven
commented, "Holmes verge[d] on saying that any serious criticism of the
war and the draft sent to men who are eligible for service would violate
[the Espionage Act]. 56
A week later, the Court reinforced this low shield when it decided
Debs v. United States.57 The circumstances of Debs were similar to those
of Schenck. Eugene Debs, a leader of the Socialist Party, was convicted
under the Espionage Act for a speech made to a general audience at a
Socialist convention.5 This speech, which contained even fewer direct
action words than Schenck's leaflet, extolled the growth of socialism and
predicted its ultimate success.9 Justice Holmes dismissed the free speech
4& Id. at 48-49.
49. Id. at 52 (concluding that "[i]t is a question of proximity and degree").
50. Id.
51. Id. at 52-53.
52. Id.
53. See KALVEN, supra note 20, at 131.
54. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
55. Id. at 132.
56. Id. at 133.
57. 249 U.S. 211,216-17 (1919).
58. Id. at 212-16.
59. KALVEN, supra note 20, at 135.
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question very quickly without elaboration: "The chief defences upon
which the defendant seemed willing to rely were the denial that we have
dealt with and that based upon the First Amendment to the Constitution,
disposed of in Schenck v. United States."' The decision in Debs left
doubt as to whether a person could safely say anything against the war
without facing prosecution.61 In the words of Kalven, "Debs marks a low
point in the Court's performance in speech cases." 62
The first major jurisprudential shift can be traced to Justice Holmes'
dissent in Abrams v. United States.63  The Abrams defendants were
convicted for violating several 1918 amendments to the Espionage Act
after printing approximately five thousand leaflets condemning the
United States for sending troops into Russia and calling for a general
strike of workers in munitions factories'f The Court, relying on Schenck,
upheld the conviction and curtly disposed of the First Amendment
challenge.65 Justice Holmes, joined by Justice Brandeis, dissented in
what has become Justice Holmes' most influential free speech
pronouncement.6 Justice Holmes applied the "clear and present danger"
test and concluded that the First Amendment protected the defendants'
words.67 Justice Holmes' interpretation of the "clear and present danger"
test afforded greater free speech protection than Schenck and Debsf6
Justice Holmes' argument took two main steps: to fall beyond the scope
of First Amendment protection, both danger and intent must be
60. Debs, 249 U.S. at 215.
61. KALVEN, supra note 20, at 136 (noting that "[I]f Eugene Debs can be sent to jail
for a public speech, what, if anything can the ordinary man safely say against the war?").
62. Id.
63. 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that "nobody can
suppose that the surreptitious publishing of a silly leaflet, by an unknown man, without
more, would present an immediate danger that its opinions would hinder the success of
the government").
64. Id. at 616-22.
65. Id. at 618-19, 624. The Court, in Abrams, wrote,
[1]t is argued, somewhat faintly, that the acts charged against the defendants
were not unlawful because within the protection of that freedom of speech and
of the press which is guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States, and that the entire Espionage Act is unconstitutional because
in conflict with that Amendment.
This contention is sufficiently discussed and is definitely negatived in Schenck v.
United States ....
Id. at 618-19.
66. See KALVEN, supra note 20, at 141.
67. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 627-30 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 627-28.
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present.69 Justice Holmes observed that danger was lacking, as "nobody
can suppose that the surreptitious publishing of a silly leaflet by an
unknown man, without more, would present any immediate danger that
its opinion would hinder the success of the government arms or have any
appreciable tendency to do so." ' Second, Justice Holmes reasoned that
intent was lacking because the "the only object of the paper is to help
Russia and stop American intervention there against the popular
government-not to impede the United States in the war that it was
carrying on."7 In sum, Justice Holmes interpreted the "clear and present
danger" test as a two-pronged inquiry that demands the requisite danger
and the requisite intent, neither of which was present in Abrams."
In the years following Abrams, the dissents by Justices Holmes and
Brandeis became increasingly influential and appeared to emerge as the
voice of the Court.73 When the World War I cases were decided, Justice
Holmes' "clear and present danger" test seemed firmly embedded in the
law.74 The Court, however, retreated from Justice Holmes' view in the
mid-1920s, when the Court, free of wartime pressures, rejected the "clear
and present danger" test.75 For this brief period, only Justices Brandeis
and Holmes continued to endorse the "clear and present danger" test.7"
The Court departed from the "clear and present danger" test in two
notable free speech cases reviewing convictions for general advocacy of
violence. The first of these cases, Gitlow v. New York,77 reviewed a
conviction of members of the Socialist Party, for publication of a Left
Wing Manifesto, under a New York statute that criminalized the
advocacy of anarchy.' The Court upheld the constitutionality of the
69. KALVEN, supra note 20, at 143.
70. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 629 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
72. KALVEN, supra note 20, at 143. This reading of the "clear and present danger"
test explains the outcomes in Schenck and Debs. Although danger was lacking in Schenck
and Debs, a jury could have concluded that the requisite intent was present. Id. at 143-44.
73. See id.
74. Id.
75. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371-72 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652,668-70 (1925).
76. See, e.g., Whitney, 274 U.S. at 374-76; Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 672-73.
77. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
7& Id. at 654-55. The relevant terms of the statute were:
[Section] 160. Criminal anarchy defined. Criminal anarchy is the doctrine that
organized government should be overthrown by force or violence, or by
assassination of the executive head or of any of the executive officials of
government, or by any unlawful means. The advocacy of such doctrine either by
word of mouth or writing is a felony.
[Section] 161. Advocacy of criminal anarchy. Any person who:
(Vol. 51:425
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statute, emphasizing a state's right to "punish utterances endangering the
foundations of organized government and threatening its overthrow by
unlawful means."79 Justice Holmes' dissent advocated application of the
"clear and present danger" test, and argued that the manifesto failed to
present any danger of an attempt to overthrow the government by
force." In Holmes' view, the manifesto was nothing more than a
statement of political theory."
The second case was Whitney v. California.82 The defendant in
Whitney was a member of the Communist Labor Party," who was
convicted for violating a general advocacy statute of California, entitled
the Criminal Syndicalism Act."' At issue in Whitney was a resolution that
the defendant proposed at the party convention." The Court adopted its
reasoning from Gitlow. 6 The Court deferred to the power of the states
to criminalize acts of force, violence, or terrorism that involve danger to
By word of mouth or writing advocates, advises or teaches the duty, necessity or
propriety of overthrowing or overturning organized government by force or
violence, or by assassination of the executive head or of any of the executive
officials of government, or by any unlawful means; or,
Prints, publishes, edits, issues or knowingly circulates, sells, distributes or
publicly displays any book, paper, document, or written or printed matter in any
form, containing or advocating, advising or teaching the doctrine that organized
government should be overthrown by force, violence or any unlawful means,...
Is guilty of a felony and punishable by imprisonment or fine, or both.
Id. (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 160,161).
79. Id. at 667.
80. Id. at 672-73 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (distinguishing rhetoric that may create an
uprising "at some indefinite time in the future" from a present danger).
82. 274 U.S. 357 (1927). Justice Brandeis concurred in the judgment of the Court, but
did so after concluding that the conduct constituted a clear and present danger. Id. at 373,
376-79 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
83. Id. at 364.
84. Id. at 360, 364-66. The Criminal Syndicalism Act provided, in relevant parts:
Section 1. The term "criminal syndicalism" as used in this act is hereby defined
as any doctrine or precept advocating, teaching or aiding and abetting the
commission of crime, sabotage (which word is hereby defined as meaning wilful
and malicious physical damage or injury to physical property), or unlawful acts of
force and violence or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing
a change in industrial ownership or control, or effecting any political change.
Section 2. Any person who: ... 4. Organizes or assists in organizing, or is or
knowingly becomes a member of, any organization, society, group or assemblage
of persons organized or assembled to advocate, teach or aid and abet criminal
syndicalism;...
Is guilty of a felony and punishable by imprisonment.
Id. at 359-60 (quoting the California Criminal Syndicalism Act).
85. Id. at 367.
86. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 668.
2002]
Catholic University Law Review
the public peace and the security of the state."' Justice Brandeis
concurred in the judgment, but did so after concluding that the conduct
constituted a clear and present danger."'
Starting in the 1930s, however, the Court's free speech jurisprudence
underwent another shift. With the appointment of Chief Justice Charles
Evans Hughes in 1930, Justices Brandeis and Holmes gained a critical
ally.89 The significance of this change became apparent rather quickly
when Chief Justice Hughes wrote the majority opinion in Stromberg v.
California,9° the first case in the history of the Court that signaled an
explicit victory for free speech.9' In Stromberg, the Court held
unconstitutional a California statute prohibiting the display of a red flag
as a sign, symbol, or emblem of opposition to organized government. 92
The Court opined that the law curtailed "the opportunity for free
political discussion." 93  Finally, the Court began to elevate the
constitutional shield.9'
The "clear and present danger" test, previously only embraced by the
dissenters, now became the guiding doctrine of the Court. By the 1930s
and 1940s, the "clear and present danger" test "emerged as the
applicable standard not only for the kinds of issues with respect to which
it originated but also for a wide variety of other First Amendment
problems."'95 Opinions during this period treated the dissents by Justices
Brandeis and Holmes with reverence generally reserved for majority
opinions. In particular, the 1951 case, Dennis v. United States,6 left no
doubt that "clear and present danger" was the test of the Court.9 Dennis
87. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 371 (declaring only statutes that are an arbitrary or
unreasonable attempt to execute authority shall be deemed unconstitutional).
88. Id. at 373-80 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
89. KALVEN, supra note 20, at 167.
90. 283 U.S. 359, 369-70 (1931) (holding that the first clause of the California statute
unconstitutional because of its vagueness and indefinite terms).
91. KALVEN, supra note 20, at 1.67.
92. Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 361, 365. The statute in Stromberg provided:
Any person who displays a red flag, banner or badge or any flag, badge, banner,
or device of any color or form whatever in any public place or in any meeting
place or public assembly, or from or on any house, building or window as a sign,
symbol or emblem of opposition to organized government or as an invitation or
stimulus to anarchistic action or as an aid to propaganda that is of a seditious
character is guilty of a felony.
Id. at 361 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 403).
93. Id. at 369.
94. See id. at 369-70.
95. Kent Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 645,706.
96. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
97. Id. at 507-08.
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affirmed the conviction of organizers of the Communist Party under the
Smith Act.9 In doing so, the Court unequivocally followed the
formulation by Justices Holmes and Brandeis:
Although no case subsequent to Whitney and Gitlow has
expressly overruled the majority opinions in those cases, there
is little doubt that the subsequent opinions have inclined toward
the Holmes-Brandeis rationale ....
In this case, we are squarely presented with the application of
the "clear and present danger" test, and must decide what the
phrase imports.
A plurality of the Court interpreted the "clear and present danger"
test in the same manner as Judge Hand in the lower court: "'In each case
[courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to
avoid the danger. ' '' "' The Dennis formulation of the "clear and present
danger" test, however, appears severely watered down from the standard
advanced in the dissents of Justices Holmes and Brandeis. Kalven
believed that the Court in Dennis adjusted the "clear and present
danger" test to meet the political demands of the case, but in doing so
gave the test the proverbial "kiss of death."' 0'
9& Id. at 516-17. The Smith Act provided, in relevant part:
Sec. 2. (a) It shall be unlawful for any person --
(1) to knowingly or willfully advocate, abet, advise, or teach the duty, necessity,
desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any government in the
United States by force or violence, or by the assassination of any officer of any
such government;
(2) with intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of any government in the
United States, to print, publish, edit, issue, circulate, sell, distribute, or publicly
display any written or printed matter advocating, advising, or teaching the duty,
necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any
government in the United States by force or violence;
(3) to organize or help to organize any society, group, or assembly of persons
who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruction of any
government in the United States by force or violence; or to be or become a
member of, or affiliate with, any such society, group, or assembly of persons,
knowing the purposes thereof.
(b) For the purposes of this section, the term "government in the United States"
means the Government of the United States, the government of any State,
Territory, or possession of the United States, the government of the District of
Columbia, or the government of any political subdivision of any of them.
Sec. 3. It shall be unlawful for any person to attempt to commit, or to conspire to
commit, any of the acts prohibited by the provisions of this title.
Id. at 496-97 (quoting Smith Act Sections 2 and 3, 54 Stat. 671, 18 U.S.C. §§ 10-11 (1946)).
99. Id. at 507-08.
100. Id. at 510 (quoting Dennis v. United States, 183 F.2d 201,212 (2d Cir. 1950)).
101. KALVEN, supra note 20, at 190-91.
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This death occurred in Brandenburg, where the Court repudiated the
"clear and present danger" test and brought into power the modern-day
incitement test.'02 Although Brandenburg was a brief, per curiam
opinion, the standard articulated in that opinion represented a major
development in First Amendment jurisprudence and has become a
cornerstone of constitutional law."°3 Brandenburg demonstrated a
conscious and sharp departure from past decisions and elevated the
shield to new heights. The Court raised this shield by forging a clear
dichotomy between mere advocacy of violence and incitement.i1
4
Kalven identified two primary objectives in the Brandenburg decision.
First, the Court eliminated censorship of "mere advocacy" of violence,
extending protection to all advocacy of violence, even the advocacy of
particular acts.1 5 As such, the Court explicitly rejected the Gitlow and
Whitney decisions which permitted the censorship of general advocacy of
violence."' The Fourth Circuit interpreted the Brandenburg decision as
a right to advocate lawlessness, one of the ultimate safeguards of
liberty. °7 In the words of the Fourth Circuit:
Even in a society of laws, one of the most indispensable
freedoms is that to express in the most impassioned terms the
most passionate disagreement with the laws themselves, the
institutions of, and created by, law, and the individual officials
with whom the laws and institutions are entrusted. Without the
freedom to criticize that which constrains, there is no freedom
at all.'08
In addition to significantly narrowing the permissible level of
censorship, the Court reset the boundary line of permissible censorship
of advocacy as that which "is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. '"'" By
placing the mere advocacy of violence beyond censorship, Brandenburg
elevated the proverbial shield to unprecedented heights."" The free
speech safeguards established by Brandenburg become even more
glaring when the standard is compared to Judge Hand's incitement
102. Id. at 124; see also Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449-50 (1969).
103. KALVEN, supra note 20, at 123; see also Rice v. Paladin Enters., 128 F.3d 233, 243
(4th Cir. 1997).
104. Id.
105. KALVEN, supra note 20, at 123-24.
106. Brandenberg, 394 U.S. at 749, 752.
107. Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 243 (4th Cir. 1997).
108. Id.
109. KALVEN, supra note 20, at 124 (citing Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447).
H1O. See id. at 123-24.
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standard from Masses."' Judge Hand's steadfast focus on words
permitted censorship of speech without any consideration of the
surroundings." 2 In contrast, the Brandenburg standard looks beyond
words and includes contextual considerations as well."3 Words alone
were no longer sufficient to constitute incitement. The days of Schenck
and Debs were behind the Court, and the Court now recognized the
importance of protecting a right to voice objection to the government.
11 4
Kalven further explained the meaning of Brandenburg in terms of
certain requisite elements that emerged as necessary for censorship of
speech."5 These elements include:
(i) to require, somewhat pedantically, that the message contain
explicit action words. If we do not draw the line here, it will
prove impossible to control the inclination to perceive implicit
action commands and urgings in all serious criticism of
government.
(ii) to require that the action words be urgings of direct,
immediate, concrete action.
(iii) to read the message as a whole, and to develop sensitivity in
reading the metaphors of violence which are frequent in radical
rhetoric.
(iv) to view the problem from the perspective of the
countervalues to be protected; and to read the message against
a tradition of robust criticism and political tolerance."' -
With the culmination of Brandenburg, the Court came very close to
adopting each of these criteria, thereby establishing a high threshold for
censorship."7
C. Subsequent Applications of Brandenburg
Judicial interpretations of Brandenburg have remained faithful to the
lofty protection of free speech discussed in the previous section."8
Courts have left little doubt that only the most egregious circumstances
justify censoring speech as incitement.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 38-43.
112. Masses Publ'n Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
113. Brandenberg, 395 U.S. at 447-48.
114. Id. at 447 n.2.
115. KALVEN, supra note 20, at 120-21.
116. Id. at 121.
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., NAACP v. Clairbore Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928-29 (1982); Hess v.
Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1973).
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The Supreme Court's first application of the incitement standard came
in the 1973 decision, Hess v. Indiana,"9 a ruling which reinforced
Brandenburg's causation principle. 20 Gregory Hess was convicted for
violating an Indiana disorderly conduct statute 2' when he proclaimed to
a crowd, "We'll take the f****** street later," after the police tried to
break up an antiwar demonstration.' Applying Brandenburg, the trial
court concluded that Hess's speech was "intended to incite further
lawless action on the part of the crowd in the vicinity ... and was likely
to produce such action."'' 3 The Court reversed Hess' conviction for two
reasons. First, the Supreme Court held that his statement fell short of
incitement because it was not directed to any person or group of persons,
and therefore his statement was not advocating any action. 24 Second, the
Court concluded that Hess' words were not intended to produce, or
likely to produce, imminent disorder.2 5 More specifically, the Court
noted that Hess' words, "We'll take the f****** street later," could be
taken, at best, as "counsel for present moderation" or, at worst, as
advocating "illegal action at some indefinite future time."' 26 According
to the Court, neither interpretation constituted a present threat of
imminent disorder.
27
The Court again applied the incitement standard in NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co.'28 During a civil rights boycott Charles Evers,
the Field Secretary of the NAACP, allegedly threatened violence against
boycott breakers.'29 The Court held that Evers' speeches "did not
transcend the bounds" set forth by Brandenburg because he was making
an impassioned plea for black citizens to unify.'.. Moreover, the Court
119. 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
120. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 111 (1992).
121. The statute provided: "Whoever shall act in a loud, boisterous or disorderly
manner so as to disturb the peace and quiet of any neighborhood or family, by loud or
unusual noise, or by tumultuous or offensive behavior, threatening, traducing, quarreling,
challenging to fight or fighting, shall be deemed guilty of disorderly conduct ...." Hess,
414 U.S. at 105 n.1 (citing IND. CODE § 35-27-2-1 (1971), IND. CODE STAT. § 10-1510
(Supp. 1972) (repealed 1976)).
122. Id. at 105-07.
123. Hess v. Indiana, 297 N.E.2d 413,415 (Ind. 1973), rev'd, 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
124. Hess, 414 U.S. at 108-09.
125. Id. at 109.
126. Id. at 108.
127. Id. at 108-09.
128. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
129. Id. at 898.
130. Id. at 928 (noting that "[a]n advocate must be free to stimulate his audience with
spontaneous and emotional appeals for unity and action in a common cause").
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noted such appeals are naturally spontaneous and emotional."' The
Court held that because Evers' appeals did not incite lawless action, they
merited First Amendment protection. 32
Lower courts have been rather reticent in developing the incitement
standard any further. Most lower courts' discussions of incitement
merely have reiterated Brandenburg's standard verbatim. Courts have
typically construed the Brandenburg test as requiring the fulfillment of
three elements: "(1) the speaker subjectively intended incitement; (2) in
context, the words used were likely to produce imminent lawless action;
and (3) the words used by the speaker objectively encouraged and urged
incitement." '33 In applying these elements, courts have maintained the
spirit of Brandenburg by restricting censorship to only the most
dangerous and egregious speech.TM
II. THE SPECTER OF INCITEMENT ON THE INTERNET
A. The Explosion of the Internet
The Internet has transformed the manner in which individuals across
the globe communicate. With the Internet, individuals possess "an easy
and inexpensive way . . . to reach a large audience, potentially of
millions."'35 As one commentator noted:
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. John L. Diamond & James L. Primm, Rediscovering Traditional Tort Typologies
to Determine Media Liability for Physical Injuries: From the Mickey Mouse Club to Hustler
Magazine, 10 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 969, 970-72 (1988); e.g., NAACP v.
Claibome Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 929 (1982) (holding that when appeals to a crowd
"do not incite lawless action, they must be regarded as protected speech"); United States
v. Poocha, 259 F.3d 1077, 1085 (9th Cir. 2001) (inquiring into whether defendant's
statements were intended to or likely to incite a crowd to violence); Glen v. Hongisto, 438
F. Supp. 10, 18 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (interpreting Brandenburg standard as "require[ing] not
only imminence and the likelihood of evil, but also an element of intent, as the speech
must be 'directed to' inciting or producing imminent lawless action"); In re Welfare of
M.A.H. and J.L.W., 572 N.W. 2d 752, 759 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (considering the context
of the circumstances to determine whether words were "intended to and likely to produce
imminent lawless action" by others nearby); New York v. Prisinzano, 648 N.Y.2d 267
(N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1996) (applying Brandenburg as imposing four elements: "(1) the content
of the speech advocates the use of force or violation of law; (2) the speaker intends to
incite or produce a violation of law; (3) there exists a likelihood that lawless response will
occur; and (4) such a lawless response is imminent"); see United States v. Slavin, No. 89
Cr. 310, 1990 WL 71479, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 1990) (stating that prior cases "stand for
the proposition that rhetorical threats or advocacy of violence in the context of a speech
can be proscribed only if the speech is likely to produce imminent lawless action").
134. Diamond & Primm, supra note 133, at 972.
135. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 843 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
2002]
Catholic University Law Review
Quickly fading are the days in which a person's main venue for
expressing her revolutionary views included standing on a
soapbox or distributing leaflets. Instead, the Internet provides
any person with any opinion the ability to reach a virtually
unlimited audience without the formidable barriers previously
posed by costly and inaccessible mainstream visual or print
media. '6
The number of Americans with these new avenues of communication
is almost unfathomable, and grows every day. Estimates place the global
population of Internet users at roughly 200 million.'37
The Internet enables a myriad of opportunities for communicating.
The most common means of disseminating information is through Web
sites. A Web site enables people to publish messages on any topic they
desire at relatively little cost.38 Electronic mail has become extremely
common as well, as many students and employees have accounts. In
addition, electronic messages are often sent to individuals who do not
request or necessarily want the message, as seen in the growth of "spam"
messages.'39 A more recent phenomenon is instant message systems,
which are similar to electronic mail and notify the recipient of the
message immediately. 4' Instant message systems, therefore, allow real
time communication between persons in a manner that resembles actual
conversation. In addition, on-line bulletin boards allow people to post
their opinions on a wide range of subjects. 4 ' Another form of
communication on the Internet is chat rooms. Similar to instant message
systems, chat rooms most resemble normal conversation because they
allow members to "speak" to each other in real time.' 4 Chat rooms are
often divided into subject areas so users can discuss mutually desired
topics.
Additionally, the Internet population constitutes a representative
cross-section of American society. While Web surfers were once
predominantly more affluent and better educated than the average
person, inexpensive computers and a highly competitive market for
136. Bruce Braun et al., WWW. Commercial- Terrorism.com: A Proposed Federal
Criminal Statute Addressing the Solicitation of Commercial Terrorism Through the
Internet, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 159, 159 (2000).
137. Kirchofer, supra note 5, at 31.
138. Johns, supra note 1, at 1389 n.55.
139. HARRY NEWTON, NEWTON'S TELECOM DICTIONARY 641 (17th ed. 2001).
140. Id. at 352.
141. Id. at 106.
142. Id. at 142.
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Internet services are changing this profile.143 Furthermore, almost all
computers sold today have Internet access, and free Internet service
providers are helping to bridge the economic gap."" Consequently, the
number of Americans with Internet access grows daily and is expected to
continue to grow in the foreseeable future. By 2005 the number of
Internet users worldwide is expected to triple and reach 600 million.
145
B. Examples of Possible Internet Incitement
The Internet revolution has created a very real danger of arguably
unconstitutional speech. In the colloquial sense of the word, various
messages found on the Internet could be considered incitement to
lawless action. Many Internet communications not only encourage
viewers to engage in illegal acts, but also provide explicit instructions for
doing so.'46 Whether they fall under the legal category of incitement,
however, is a different story. The Brandenburg standard for incitement
imposes a very high bar for censorship, allowing only the most egregious
speech to be silenced. 47 The main concern, however, is that current free
speech jurisprudence lacks a cohesive framework for assessing whether
an Internet message constitutes incitement; consequently, the law is ill-
prepared to determine whether a restraint on Internet speech is
constitutional. This section outlines some of the more glaring instances
of potential Internet incitement.
This section hardly aims to provide an exhaustive list of Internet
messages that could qualify as incitement. There are countless Web sites,
message boards, and listservs that contain messages of hate and
bigotry.'48 A complete list of such postings is unnecessary at this point.
Rather, this section shows that the potential for incitement exists on the
Internet.
1. The Nuremberg Files Web Site
Perhaps the most well-known example of possible Internet incitement
is a pro-life Web site known as the "Nuremberg Files."' 49 Pro-life activist
143. Chidi, supra note 6, at 1.
144. See id.
145. Kirchofer, supra note 5, at 31.
146. See infra Part I.B.2.
147. See supra Part I.
148. The Southern Poverty Law Center estimates that the number of Web sites
featuring hate speech stands at 250. McCafferty, supra note 10, at 6.
149. See The Nuremberg Files, at http://209.41.174.82/atrocity/aborts.html (last visited
Nov. 5,2001).
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Neil Horsley created the Nuremberg Files Web site in 1997 with the
purported rationale of maintaining a list of abortion providers to
facilitate their prosecution when abortion is criminalized. 50  The Web
site lists approximately 400 abortionists, labeling them as "baby
butchers" and supplying extensive personal information, including home
and work addresses, pictures, spouses' names, and phone numbers.
151
This information was placed below an image of blood dripping from
body parts of aborted babies. 1 2 When a doctor listed on the Web site
was injured, the operators printed the name in gray; when a listed doctor
was killed, the operators immediately struck a line through the doctor's
153
name.
The constitutionality of the Nuremberg Files Web site was evaluated
under the First Amendment's "true threat" standard.' 54 On February 2,
1999, a federal jury found that several pro-life organizations and
individuals associated with the Web site were in violation of the Freedom
150. See Patrick McMahon, Anti-Abortion Site Kicked Off Web, USA TODAY, Feb. 8,
1999, at 2A (noting Horsley testified that he developed the Web site); Lynne K. Varner,
Tension Rises for Abortion Doctors, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 30,1998, at B1. The Web site
draws its name from the trial of Nazis war criminals at Nuremberg. Explaining the
purpose of the Web site, the operators contended that they planned to use the information
collected on the Web site to prosecute the doctors and pro-choice activists. The Web site
read:
One of the great tragedies of the Nuremberg trials of Nazis after WWII was that
complete information and documented evidence had not been collected so many
war criminals went free or were only found guilty of minor crimes. We do not
want the same thing to happen when the day comes to charge abortionists with
their crimes.
The Nuremberg Files, at http://209.41.174.82/atrocity/aborts.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2001).
The original Nuremberg Files Web site was removed from the Internet following the
jury verdict in a lawsuit that featured the Web site. See infra text accompanying notes 155-
159.
151. Baby Butchers on Trial, at http://209.41.174.82.atrocity/aborts.html (last visited
Nov. 5, 2001); Brief for the ACLU of Oregon at 9, Planned Parenthood of the
Columbia/Williamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (D. Or.
1998), vacated and remanded, 244 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2001); James C. Goodale, Can
Planned Parenthood Silence a ProLife Web Site?, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 2, 1999, at 3 (stating that
200 doctors were listed on the Web site at the time of the article); Jacqueline
Soteropoulos, Florida Doctors Named on Web Site Fear for Lives, TAMPA TRIB., Feb. 3,
1999, at 12.
152. Baby Butchers on Trial, supra note 151; Michele Mandel, Fanning the Flames of
Hatred, TORONTO SUN, Apr. 4, 1999, at 5 (describing the Web site); Varner, supra note
150 (describing the Web site).
153. See Editorial, Free Speech or Threats?, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 5,
1999, at 8B. The Web site itself provided a legend to understand the typefaces used. Baby
Butchers on Trial, supra note 151.
154. Planned Parenthood, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1188-94.
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of Access to Clinic Entrance Act (FACE) 55 and the Racketeer Influence
and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) 156 and awarded the doctors $107
million in actual and punitive damages. 57 Because the judge utilized an
arguably broad and relaxed definition of "threats" which appeared
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on "true threats,"'58
several commentators predicted that the jury verdict would not survive
on appeal.'59 On March 28, 2001, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit vacated and remanded the trial verdict holding that the actions of
155. See Mandel, supra note 152, at 5. FACE, in pertinent part, makes liable for civil
and criminal penalties whoever:
by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intentionally injures,
intimidates or interferes with or attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with
any person because that person is or has been, or in order to intimidate such
person or any other person or any class of persons from, obtaining or providing
reproductive health services.
18 U.S.C. § 248 (a)(1) (1994).
156. RICO, in pertinent part, provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to
conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1994).
157. Jules Crittenden, Jury Clamps Down on Anti-Abortion Web Site, BOSTON
HERALD, Feb. 3,1999, at 1 (discussing jury verdict); Patrick McMahon, Jury Hits Abortion
Web Site Awards $107M, Says Doctors Were Threatened, USA TODAY, Feb. 3,1999, at 1A
(same); Kim Murphy, Anti-Abortion Web Site Fined $107 Million Courts: Gruesome
Internet Destination Constitutes Threat to Doctors, Ruling Says, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1999,
at Al (same); Rene Sanchez, Doctors Win Suit Over Antiabortion Web Site: Jury Finds
"Hit List," Awards $107 Million, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 1999, at Al (same).
158. The Supreme Court developed the "true threat" standard for free speech in the
seminal case, Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam). In Watts, the
Court pronounced that only the most serious and dangerous threats would be punished,
emphasizing "a profound national conunitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials." Id. (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
159. See, e.g., John P. Cronan, Note, Free Speech on the Internet: Does the First
Amendment Protect the "Nuremberg [sic] Files"?, 2 YALE SYMP. L. & TECH 5 (2000), at
http:Illawtech. law. yale. edu/symposium/00/comment-cronan.htm; John Rothchild,
Menacing Speech and the First Amendment: A Functional Approach to Incitement that
Threatens, 8 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 207, 218-24 (1999) (contrasting the Nuremberg Files
Web site with the threat found in United States v. Khorumm, 895 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir.
1996)); Elaine Lafferty, Ruling Against Anti-Abortion Website Raises Storm in US over
Rights, IRISH TIMES, Feb. 4, 1999, at 14 (observing that several legal experts fear that the
judge interpreted the threats too liberally and that the American Civil Liberties Union
plans to join in an appeal). But see Melanie C. Hagan, Note, The Freedom of Access to
Clinic Entrances Act and The Nuremberg Files Web Site: Is the Site Properly Prohibited or
Protected Speech?, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 411 (2000) (arguing that the jury verdict should be
affirmed on appeal because of the jurisprudence regarding FACE).
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the pro-life organizations were not threats unprotected by the First
Amendment! 6' The Ninth Circuit admonished the potentially chilling
effect on free speech if the Nuremberg Files Web site were considered a
threat not worthy of First Amendment protection.1 6' The Ninth Circuit
also criticized the jury charge, reasoning that "[u]nder the instruction in
this case, the jury could have found the anti-abortion activists liable
based on the fact that, by publishing doctors' names, the activists made it
more likely that the doctors would be harmed by third parties."'62
A more fitting characterization of this Web site may be that it is an
incitement! 6' After all, the doctors faced greater danger from individuals
viewing the Web site than from those who posted their names.
Moreover, the potential incitement at issue with the Nuremberg Files
Web site is notably heinous because the lawless action encouraged by the
Web site is to cause serious bodily injury or death. This potential
incitement has become a reality. Several abortion providers listed on the
Nuremberg Files Web site have been victims of violence."6' Although the
Web site only operated for about a year, three doctors listed on the site
were killed. 65
2. Web Sites Providing Instructions for Illegal Pranksters
Some Web sites, often in an attempt at humor, encourage readers to
commit pranks against corporations '66 or individuals. 67 These Web sites
provide extensive instructions to facilitate the reader's effort to
accomplish the prank." More often than not, the action advocated on
160. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Williamette Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life
Activists, 244 F.3d 1007, 1019-20 (9th Cir. 2001).
161. Id. at 1018.
162. Id. at 1015.
163. See supra Part I.
164. See The Nuremberg Files, at http://209.41.174.821/atrocity/aborts.html (last visited
Nov. 5, 2001) (identifying those providers that have been injured or killed).
165. See, e.g., Mandel supra note 152.
166. See, e.g., RedBoxChiliPepper, How to Turn the Work Life of a Local 7-Eleven
Employee into a Living Hell, at http://www.student.uit.no/-paalde/revenge/Scripts/7-
Sll.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2000); Charlie X., Screwing Over Your Local McDonald's, 5
PHRACK INC. MAG. 45 (Mar. 30, 1994), at http://www.phrack.org/show.php?p=22&a=4.
167. See, e.g., RedBoxChiliPepper, Ruining Someone's Life, at http://www.student.
uit.no/-paalde/revenge/Scripts/PLA003.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2000).
168. See, e.g., Charlie X., Screwing Over Your Local McDonald's, 5 PHRACK INC.
MAG. 45 (Mar. 30, 1994), at http://www.phrack.org/show.php?p=22&a=4; Black Knight
from 713, Hacking Voice Mail Systems, PHRACK INC. MAG. 11 (Feb. 17, 1987), at
http://www.phrack.org/show.php?p=ll &a=4.
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these Web sites is not just an annoying prank, but is clearly illegal
activity. 69
One recent concern is the emergence of Web sites encouraging viewers
to commit illegal actions against corporations, a practice that has been
coined "commercial terrorism."7 Phrack Inc. Magazine, an on-line
publication, is a leader in promoting commercial terrorism on the
Internet.'' Phrack contains articles on activities including computer
hacking, anarchy, destruction of property, and death.' Phrack has
published at least fifty-six issues and each issue contains between eight
and twenty-eight articles.'73
One Phrack article, entitled "Screwing Over Your Local McDonald's,"
is an example of the incitement that can appear on the Internet. 74 The
article encourages the reader to engage in various juvenile actions
against McDonald's, and it provides painful detail for following through.
Some are relatively harmless pranks that may be illegal, such as making
ridiculous orders, throwing trays in the garbage, taking extra pennies
from the "Need a Penny-Take a Penny" cups, asking stupid questions,
annoying the drive-thru attendants, and pouring boiling water into
garbage cans to melt the sides of the bag and cause garbage to go
everywhere.' Other actions are clearly illegal. 76 For example, the
article advocates placing false advertisements on behalf of McDonald's,
falsely claiming to find hair in your food, and hacking into the
restaurant's computer system.' The article ends with a particularly
disturbing message: "If you get bored, start molesting kids on the
playland or just break [expletive] .. .throwing salt shakers (plastic or
glass) at the outside wall of the McDonald's is fun too . . . . Don't
169. See, e.g., CO/der DEC/oder of Dark Side Research, Fraudulent Applications of
"900" Services, 18 PHRACK INC. MAG. 45 (Mar. 30, 1994), at
http:/www.phrack.org/show.php?p=45&a=18; Gin Fizz & Ninja NYC, How to Pick Master
Locks, 1 PHRACK INC. MAG. 6 (Nov. 17, 1985), at http://phrack.org/show.php?p=l&a=6.
170. For a discussion of "commercial terrorism" and a proposed federal statute to
address the problem, see generally Braun et al., supra note 136.
171. See id. at 161-62.
172. See Introduction, I PHRACK INC. MAG. 1 (Nov. 17, 1985) at
http://www.phrack.org/show.php?p=l &a=l.
173. See PHRACK INC. MAG., at http://www.phrack.org/show.php (last visited Nov. 6,
2001) (listing the volumes and articles published).
174. Charlie X, Screwing Over Your Local McDonald's, 5 PHRACK INC. MAG., 45
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consider it illegal (most of it isn't ...) consider it more of a public
service."'"
8
Other articles from Phrack encourage additional illegal acts. Some of
these articles include "A Novice's Guide to Hacking,"179 "A Hacker's
Guide to the Internet,"' ' "Hacking Voice Mail Systems,' 8' "Fraudulent
Application of '900' Services,"" and "How to Pick Master Locks.""'
Like the McDonald's article, these articles provide extremely precise
detail for how to achieve the pranks.
Phrack is hardly the only provider of explicit instructions for illegal
pranks. For example, one Web site, posted by a group known as
RedBoxChiliPepper, is titled "How To Turn the Work Life of a Local 7-
Eleven Employee into a Living Hell" and enumerates sixty-four pranks
to commit in the store.'m Like Phrack, these pranks range from
borderline illegal to unquestionably illegal."' Among the many pranks
listed are taking bites out of the cookies and donuts, putting Ex-Lax into
food and drink, writing graffiti on the sidewalk, slicing the milk cartons
with a razor blade, causing the coffee pot to overflow, and discarding
items that are for sale.""8 The Web site provides extensive instructions
explaining how to accomplish these pranks."'7
Corporations are not the sole targets of possible Internet incitement.
Many Web sites instruct viewers on how to harm individuals."" An
article from RedBoxChiliPepper presents a guide for "ruining someone's
life" and offers detailed instructions on how to perform a vast array of
17& Id.
179. The Mentor, A Novice's Guide to Hacking-1989 Edition, 4 PHRACK INC. MAG.
22 (Dec. 23, 1988), at http://www.phrack.org/show.php?p=22&a=4.
180. The Gatsby, A Hacker's Guide to the Internet, 3 PHRACK INC. MAG. 33 (Sept. 15,
1991), at http://www.phrack.org/show.php?p=33&a=3.
181. Black Knight from 713, Hacking Voice Mail Systems, PHRACK INC. MAO. 11
(Feb. 17,1987), at http://www.phrack.org/show.php?p=ll&a=4.
182. COlder DEC/oder of Dark Side Research, Fraudulent Application of '900'
Services, 18 PHRACK INC. MAG. 45 (Mar. 30, 1994), at www.phrack.org/show.php?p
=45&a=18.
183. Gin Fizz & Ninja NYC, How to Pick Master Locks, I PHRACK INC. MAG. 6 (Nov.
17, 1985), at http://www.phrack.org/show.php?p=l&a=6.
184. RedBoxChiliPepper, How To Turn the Work Life of a Local 7-Eleven Employee





188. See, e.g., Pal D. Ekran, The Avenger, at http://www.ikran.no/htm/revenge (last
visited Sept. 13, 2000); RedBoxChiliPepper, Ruining Someone's Life, at http://www.
student.uit.no/-paalde/revenge/Scripts/PLA003.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2000).
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illegal actions against another individual.'8 Another Web site is posted
by an individual who operates under the moniker "the avenger ' '19 and
includes a handbook of ways to make an individual "suffer in one way or
another."' 9' The suggested tactics include canceling credit cards and
phone cards, placing false classified advertisements, falsely reporting the
individual to the police for criminal activity, subscribing to magazines for
the individual, and forwarding his mail to different addresses.
192
III. THE CYBERSPACE LIMITATIONS OF BRANDENBURG
Whether these instances of possible Internet incitement should receive
First Amendment protection remains unclear. The problem, however, is
that under the current Brandenburg standard, they cannot even be
evaluated. Although the Brandenburg standard fails to address Internet
incitement, this failure is not surprising. The Brandenburg opinion was
handed down in 1969, two decades before the Internet emerged.1 93 The
Brandenburg standard was not created for cyberspace and later courts
interpreting the standard had no need to address the demands of the
Internet.194
The flaw in the current standard is simple. The Brandenburg
formulation does not work on the Internet because of the different
speaker-audience relationship that exists in cyberspace.' 9  More
specifically, the Internet poses two obstacles to applying Brandenberg.
First is the ambiguity of Brandenburg's imminent, lawless action inquiry
in cyberspace.' 6 The second difficulty is the challenge of defining the
audience in cyberspace.' 9'
189. See RedBoxChiliPepper, Ruining Someone's Life, at
http://www.student.uit.no/-paalde/revenge/Scripts/PLA003.htnl (last visited Sept. 13,
2000).
190. The Web site operator's real name is Pal D. Ekran. See Pal D. Ekran, The
Avenger, at http://www.ekran.no/html/revenge (last visited Sept. 13, 2000).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844
(1997).
194. See NAACP v. Clairborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982); Hess v.
Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1973).
195. See John F. Wirenius, Giving the Devil the Benefit of Law. Pornographers, the
Feminist Attack on Free Speech and the First Amendment, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 27, 70-
71 (1992); John Rothchild, Menacing Speech and the First Amendment: A Functional
Approach to Incitement that Threatens, 8 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 207, 217 (1999).
196. See infra Part III.A.
197. See infra Part III.B.
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A. Ambiguity of Brandenburg's "Imminence Requirement" in
Cyberspace
The Internet facilitates several forms of communication, including
Web sites, electronic messages, listservs, discussion groups, chat rooms,
and instant messages. Of these forms of communication, only two, chat
rooms198 and instant messages,' 99 allow the recipient of a message to
"hear" it once it is "spoken." In other Internet communications, a time
delay prevents words from being heard often until well after they are
spoken. Herein lies a major difference between Internet communication
and the forms of communication that have traditionally been subject to
the incitement standard. When incitement occurs on street corners or at
rallies, the words are heard immediately after they are spoken. In these
instances, there is no time delay between speaking and hearing.
The problem with a time delay lies in Brandenburg's imminence
requirement. A fundamental component of the Brandenburg standard is
that speech directed at some indefinite time does not constitute
incitement.X" Although courts have regarded the imminence
requirement as the primary focus of the incitement standard,"' it remains
unclear what this requirement means in cyberspace. If the imminence
requirement is interpreted as imminence from the perspective of the
speaker, in other words incitement that occurs immediately after the
words are spoken, the vast majority of Internet communications can
198. Chat rooms allow participants to have a real time conversation with other
individuals sharing similar interests. See AOL Anywhere: People & Chat Directory, at
http://www.aol.com/community/directory.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2002) (listing popular
chat rooms for America Online users); MSN People and Chat, at
http://communities.msn.com/people (Mar. 5, 2002) (instructing that MSN users can "create
a community or join a community listed in our directory"); Yahoo! Chat, at
http://chat.yahoo.com/?room=Chat%20Central::1.60032456 (last visited Mar. 5, 2002)
(listing "Chat Categories" for Yahoo! Users).
199. Yahoo! explains that its instant messenger service allows participants to "quickly
exchange messages" with other individuals online and "[u]nlike email, instant messages
appear as soon as they're sent." Yahoo Messenger, at http://www.messenger.yahoo.com
(last visited Mar. 5, 2002); see also MSN Messenger Service-Features, at
http://messenger.msn.com/support/features.asp?client=l (last visited Mar. 5, 2002)
(explaining MSN's instant messenger service); AOL Instant Messenger: Help/FAQs:
Starting Out, at http://www.aim.comhelpjaq/starting-out/getstarted.adp?aolperm=h (last
visited Mar. 5, 2002) (answering frequently asked questions about America Online's
instant messenger service).
200. E.g., Hess, 414 U.S. at 108-09 (advocating "illegal action at some indefinite or
future time" does not constitute unconstitutional incitement); Byers v. Edmondson, 712
So. 2d 681 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1998) (holding that "[s]peech directed to action at some
indefinite time in the future will not satisfy [Brandenburg's] test").
201. See, e.g., Hess, 414 U.S. at 108.
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never constitute incitement, regardless of the message.n This ambiguity
of the imminence requirement has yet to be addressed by courts because
in traditional forms of communication, imminence from the perspective
of the speaker and imminence from the perspective of the listener are
identical. The Hess decision indicates that the "imminence requirement"
should be interpreted as lawless action occurring immediately after the
words are spoken .2  The Court in Hess held that because the alleged
incitement could, at worst, be interpreted as advocating "illegal action at
some indefinite future time," the words fell short of incitement .2°
Therefore, the time delay between when the words were spoken and
when the illegal action could occur seemed to prevent the
communication in Hess from constituting incitement.2 If this
interpretation is accepted, very few Internet communications could ever
constitute incitement, regardless of their messages.2 6
Additionally, unlike the audience of a protest, the audience who
receives an inciting Internet message will not be able to act immediately
on the incitement. In many instances, the incited reader would have to
travel some distance to commit the lawless activity. For example, a
viewer of the Nuremberg Files Web site who is incited to violence would
have to travel to the home or work of the named abortion provider. As
the Court held in Hess, a delay in time defeats imminence.2W In Hess, the
Court regarded the words of the defendant as, at worst, advocating
"illegal action at some indefinite future time.''20 For that reason, the
words in Hess fell short of a threat of imminent disorder?, A reasonable
interpretation of Hess would be that unless the reader of an Internet
posting commits the lawless activity minutes after receiving the message,
a disqualifying delay occurs and the posting is automatically protected
under the First Amendment.210 Such immediacy is virtually impossible
with most Internet postings.
202. See Rothchild, supra note 195, at 217.
203. Hess, 414 U.S. at 108-09.
204. Id.
205. See id. at 106-09.
206. See Rothchild, supra note 195, at 211.
207. See Hess, 414 U.S. at 108-09.
208. Id.
209. See id. at 108.
210. See id.
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B. The Uncertain Audience in Cyberspace
In contrast to a rally or protest, the audience of an Internet posting is
often uncertain. The audience receiving many Internet messages, such as
those from Web sites and discussion groups, will always be unknown to a
certain extent. Brandenburg created a speaker-audience relationship
that is analogous to that of a principal and his agent because liability only
attaches when the speaker knows the audience will act as a result of the
speech and intends that the speech incite such activity."' Under such
circumstances, and given the imminence requirement, the audience acts
under the direction of the speaker and in fulfillment of the speaker's
will."' Yet with a Web site, a similar speaker-audience relationship does
not exist. The creators of the Web site do not engage in a conversation
with specific individuals because they did not know exactly who would
view the Web site and anyone with Internet access could read their
postings.
In short, the traditional incitement standard does not address speech
on the Internet. The incitement standard suits situations like those it has
been applied to thus far, such as rallies, demonstrations, and crowded
streets. 13  In such arenas, the speaker-audience relationship is
maintained, with the presence or absence of an easily identifiable
audience. In cyberspace, a comparable speaker-audience relationship
rarely occurs, as messages tend to be viewed well after their initial
postings and by an uncertain audience.
IV. PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNET INCITEMENT STANDARD
A. Current Free Speech Jurisprudence on Internet Issues
Are current legal standards sufficient to address the speech concerns,
or is it necessary to draft new jurisprudence to meet the specific demands
211. Wirenius, infra note 195, at 70-71.
212. Id. at 49.
213. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 445-47 (1969) (articulating standard in case
involving statements made at a Klu Klux Clan rally); see NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware
Co., 458 U.S. 886, 900-06 (1982) (applying Brandenburg to statements made during a
meeting to organize a civil rights boycott); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 1.06-07 (1973)
(applying Brandenburg test to an antiwar demonstration at Indiana University); United
States v. Poocha, 259 F.3d 1077, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying incitement standard to
comments made in front of a crowd of spectators that gathered as the defendant was
arrested); New York v. Prisinzano, 648 N.Y.2d 267 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1996) (applying
Brandenburg to speech at a union protest).
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of the Internet? 24  Current free speech jurisprudence in cyberspace
provides minimal guidance for modifying the Brandenburg standard to
apply to the Internet. While free speech in cyberspace has received
extensive attention from courts and academics, this attention has largely
focused on the need to regulate obscenity and pornography on the
Internet.25 A review of these topics may be helpful, as the central
question posed in these areas resembles what courts would face in
extending the Brandenburg standard to the Internet.
The Supreme Court addressed free speech on the Internet in Reno v.
ACLU.2 16 In Reno, the Court struck down the Communications Decency
Act of 1996 (CDA), which imposed criminal liability on anyone who
knowingly distributed "indecent" or "patently offensive" material on the
Internet to anyone under the age of eighteen. Although supportive of
the goal of the CDA, the Court held that the Act was overbroad because
it also prevented adults from accessing certain Web sites.
28
At the very least, Reno establishes the Internet as a public forum for
free speech purposes. The majority opinion offered a broad
endorsement of free speech in cyberspace, with much of the opinion
describing the increased possibilities of human communication that, just
years ago, was unimaginable.219 Professor Steven Gey observed, "it is not
unreasonable to suggest that the Reno majority opinion itself treats the
Internet as a public forum without actually making the designation
explicit." Gey noted that the Reno Court held the Internet to a higher
free speech standard, refusing to analogize the Internet to electronic
forums involving broadcast or cable communications, which receive
lower levels of constitutional protection than private speech in traditional
public forums.22'
214. See John F. McGuire, Note, When Speech is Heard Around the World: Internet
Content Regulation in the United States and Germany, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 750, 758-60, 759
n.42 (1999) (citing Dawn L. Johnson, Comment, It's 1996. Do You Know Where Your
Cyberkids Are? Captive Audiences and Content Regulation on the Internet, 15 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 51,79-85 (1996)).
215. See id.
216. 521 U.S. 844 (1997)
217. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133 (1996);
see also Reno, 521 U.S. at 874-77, 885.
21& Reno, 521 U.S. at 849, 868,874-75.
219. Id. at 849-53.
220. Steven G. Gey, Reopening the Public Forum-From Sidewalks to Cyberspace, 58
OHIO ST. L.J. 1535, 1611 (1998).
221. Id. Soon after Reno, Congress passed, and President Clinton signed, the Child
Online Protection Act (COPA), which requires those engaged in selling materials on the
Web that is harmful to minors restrict access to such material to people aged eighteen and
20021
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No court, however, has addressed the cyberspace implications of the
incitement standard. The most analogous analysis was performed by the
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan in United States v.
Baker,'2 where the "true threat" standard was applied to electronic mail.
In articulating the "true threat" standard, the court remained faithful to
the spirit of the standard since its birth in Watts v. United States.223 Like
prior decisions, Baker demonstrated a high hurdle required under the
"true threat" standard, as well as the reluctance of courts to punish all
but the most egregious threats.22 Paraphrasing the Second Circuit in
United States v. Kelner," the Baker court held that "only unequivocal,
unconditional and specific expressions of intention immediately to inflict
injury may be punished."226
B. Proposed Internet Incitement Standard
Unlike the "true threat" standard and obscenity, the incitement
standard has yet to be evaluated in cyberspace. As such, the incitement
standard represents one of the many constitutional inquiries that remains
vacuous in the context of the relatively new phenomenon of cyberspace.
Yet, for reasons discussed in Part III, it is hard to refute the exigency for
formulating an Internet incitement standard.
Two considerations must remain the focus if courts are to extend an
incitement standard to the Internet. First, the new standard must
older, under penalty of criminal conviction and heavy civil fines. Child Online Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998) (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 230-31). It
remains unclear whether COPA will pass constitutional muster.
The vast majority of academic literature on free speech in cyberspace has examined
similar topics, focusing government regulation of indecent material on the Internet. See,
e.g., Johns, supra note 1, at 1384-86, 1395, 1409-23 (examining the legal doctrines of
obscenity and "true threats" in relation to cyberspace); Timothy Zick, Congress, the
Internet, and the Intractable Pornography Problem: The Child Online Protection Act of
1998, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1,147 (1999) (assessing the constitutionality of COPA and
proposing an approach for future legislation seeking to protect children from harmful
material on the Internet).
222. 890 F. Supp. 1375, 1380-82 (E.D. Mich. 1995), affd, subnorr United States v.
Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997).
223. 394 U.S. 705,708 (1969); Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1380-82.
224. See Greenberg, supra note 2, at 680 (stating that Baker "illustrated the reluctance
of courts to punish all but the most egregious threats under this 'true threat' standard").
225. 534 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1976) (affirming the conviction of the leader of a radical
group who made explicit threats to assassinate Yasser Arafat).
226. Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1.382. Kelner held that the only threats that transgress the
bounds of the First Amendment are those "so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and
specific as to the person threatened, as to convey a gravity of purpose and imminent
prospect of execution." Kelner, 534 F.2d at 1027.
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maintain the spirit of Brandenburg. As discussed earlier, Brandenburg
represents the culmination of a long and arduous journey in our
country's free speech jurisprudence. 227 The constitutional shield, which at
the time of Schenck was embarrassingly low, is now strong and must
remain strong.m Courts must not use the Internet to weaken the
foundations on which the free speech tradition rests. In short, the new
standard must continue to safeguard against any chilling effect on free
speech, while preventing imminent and likely incitement to illegal
activity.
The second consideration is the unique speaker-audience relationship
created by the Internet. The new standard must remain cognizant of this
new and unexplored relationship and must adjust the Brandenburg
standard accordingly. On the Internet, unlike at a rally or protest, words
are often heard well after they are spoken.29 The Internet incitement
standard must be able to adapt to this unusual relationship.
This Article proposes how to accomplish these ends. The Internet
incitement standard should consider four primary factors: (1) imminence
from the perspective of the listener; (2) content of the message; (3) likely
audience; and (4) nature of the issue involved. In presenting these
factors, this Article attempts to demonstrate how the standard would
apply to the Nuremberg Files Web site and to the commercial terrorism
Web sites discussed in Part III.
1. Clarification of the "Imminence Requirement"
To apply the incitement standard in cyberspace, the first step is to
clarify the "imminence requirement." Under a likely interpretation of
Brandenburg, the "imminence requirement" extends only to lawless
action that results immediately after the words are spoken.20  As
discussed earlier, the nature of the Internet makes this requirement all
but impossible to satisfy because words are "heard" on the Internet often
after they are "spoken." 3' The essential question, therefore, is whether
imminence should be interpreted from the perspective of the speaker or
from the perspective of the listener.
To decide between these two interpretations of the "imminence
requirement," the first step is to assess what the Brandenburg Court
sought to target. The Court was concerned with the aftermath of the
227. See supra Part I.B.
228. See id.
229. See supra Part III.A.
230. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973).
231. See supra Part III.A.
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inciteful words. 32 In other words, the Court permitted censorship if the
speech would imminently lead to lawless action. 233 The Court reasoned
that words inciting such lawless action are harmful to free and robust
debate.TM At the same time, however, the Court was careful not to set
the bar for protection so high as to infringe upon desirable forms of
discussion .35 The "imminence requirement" serves the purpose of
keeping this bar high. By requiring a close causal connection between
the incitement and the words, the Court maintained a high level of free
speech protection. 236
The goals of preventing the undesirable consequences of incitement,
however, can only be attained on the Internet if the imminence
requirement is interpreted from the perspective of the listener. The
lawless action targeted by the Court occurs after the words are heard, not
after they are spoken . 7 Incitement that results after words are heard is
just as dangerous and repugnant to society as incitement occurring
immediately after the words are spoken. Moreover, as long as the other
criteria for Internet incitement remain committed to the core values of
Brandenburg, the danger of desirable speech facing censorship will be
avoided.
Additionally, the "imminence requirement" should be interpreted as
imminently causing a person to initiate lawless action. Unlike at a rally,
when an Internet message incites an individual to violence, that person
often cannot act on the incitement within minutes. For example, if a
viewer of the Nuremberg Files Web site were incited to lawless action
against a listed abortion provider, he would need to travel some distance
to commit that violence. This interpretation of imminence is necessary
to prohibit harmful speech that could chill debate.
Applying this criterion to the Nuremberg Files Web site and to the
commercial terrorism Web sites, a court would inquire into whether the
viewer, upon reading the message, is likely to be incited to initiate
imminent, lawless action. Without more information, however, it would
be impossible to assess the likelihood of this incitement. Therefore,
courts evaluating Internet incitement must examine other criteria as well
to assess the likelihood of imminent incitement.
232 See Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969).
233. Id. at 447.
234. Id. at 449.
235. Id. at 448-49.
236. Id. at 448.
237. See id. at 447.
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2. Content of the Message
A basic, yet nonetheless critical, element requires courts to inquire into
the specific words of the message. To be excluded from First
Amendment protection, the incitement to violence must be clear.2 As
the Court held in NAACP v. Clairborne Hardware Co., 39 the speech
cannot just be an impassioned plea, but also must be intended to incite.
2"
In Kalven's words, Brandenburg requires explicit action words;
incitement cannot be implied.2' Kalven emphasized the importance of
this clarity, expressing a fear that if the line is not drawn at explicit
words, "it will prove impossible to control the inclination to perceive
implicit action commands and urgings in all serious criticism of
government.' 242 The chilling effect of a more lenient interpretation of
Brandenburg would be considerable.
For this reason, courts must scrutinize the words of the Internet
message. The Court engaged in such careful scrutiny in Hess when it
examined the words of the speaker to determine the likely effect on the
crowd.243 Analogous close scrutiny is possible for the words on a Web
site or in electronic correspondence. In short, courts must examine
whether the Internet posting features content that, if spoken verbally,
would be likely to incite others to violence. The reason for this
meticulous scrutiny relates to the spirit of Brandenburg. Speech should
only be censored if the words are serious and are legitimate calls for
incitement. Words that are intended as jokes or are not likely to be
taken seriously should not be censored as incitement, whether they are
transmitted at a rally or in cyberspace.24  A lower standard would
compromise Brandenburg's high constitutional shield.245
This consideration is especially relevant for the commercial terrorism
Web sites.246 Many of these Web sites are unlikely to be taken seriously.
238. See NAACP v. Clairborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928-29 (1982).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 928-29.
241. KALVEN, supra note 20, at 121.
242. Id.
243. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107-109 (1973).
244. Statements that are not interpreted as legitimate calls for lawless action do not
constitute incitement. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 109 (1973) (holding that the
defendant's words, at most, "could be taken as counsel for present moderation" and thus
were protected speech); United States v. Poocha, 259 F.3d 1077, 1082 (9th Cir. 2001)
(holding that even obscenities criticizing the police shouted at an emotional crowd were
protected absent evidence that those words "constitute an incitement to riot").
245. See supra Part I.B.
246. See supra Part II.B.2.
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The Phrack Web site, for example, has a clearly sarcastic tone that may
prevent it from being interpreted as more than an attempt at humor.247 It
is possible that most reasonable viewers will regard Phrack as an attempt
at comedy, not a serious call for illegal action. The same could be said
for articles from the RedBoxChiliPepper Web site.24 Like the Phrack
articles, the articles in this publication attempt to carry a tone of sarcasm
and humor.249 Reasonable readers who view the article are likely to find
the content humorous and will not perceive it as a call for illegal action. 2 °
Another feature of the content analysis ties into the nature of the issue
involved. If the speech involves a heated debate, courts must consider
what, if any, value the message adds to the current debate. In short, does
the challenged speech foster Justice Brennan's "uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open" debate2' or does it chill debate? Potential incitement that
legitimately adds substance to an important debate should be afforded
more deference than messages that serve no probative value. However,
if the message adds nothing to the current debate or, of even greater
concern, if it risks hindering the debate, less deference should be
afforded. This is especially true of incitement messages that take an
aggressive tone in hopes of intimidating opposing viewpoints.
When applied to the Nuremberg Files Web site, this standard unearths
strong evidence that the Web site could incite individuals to lawless
action. The Web site undoubtedly was not intended as a joke. The Web
site targets an extremely serious subject, abortion, and maintains a very
morbid tone throughout. 2  A review of the Nuremberg Files Web site
demonstrates this stern tone.53 The Web site, which has been considered
by some to be akin to encouraging terrorist activity,2 "posted a veritable
hit list of abortion doctors," 5 cataloging their names, pictures, addresses,
and phone numbers and branding them "baby butchers."2' In fact, one
247. Introduction, PHRACK INC. MAG., at http://www.phrack.org/show.php?p=l&a=l.
248. See http://www.phonelosers.orglrbcp/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2001).
249. See, e.g., RedBoxChiliPepper, How to Turn the Work Life of a Local 7-Eleven
Employee into a Living Hell (Dec. 27, 1995), at http://www.phonelosers.org/issue/
pla008.htm].
250. See id.
251. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,270 (1964).
252. The Nuremberg Files, at http://209.41.174.82/atrocity/ (last visited Nov. 5,2001).
253. See id.
254. Marie Elena Baca, Minnesota Doctor on Web Site Moves About With Care, STAR
TRIB., Feb. 3, 1999, at 6A (quoting Dr. Mildren Hansen as stating "this [Web site] is not
freedom of speech, this is terrorist activity").
255. See Mandel, supra note 152, at 5.
256. See supra Part II.D.1; see also Varner, supra note 150.
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page of the Web site providing personal information on the doctors is
titled, "Third Trimester Butchers."" 7  The doctors names were listed
below what resembled dripping blood situated near a bloodied
cartoonish representation punctuating its screaming headlines about
baby killers.5 s Moreover, when listing the personal information, the
Web site used more inflammatory phrases, such as "[t]here must be a
special place in hell for such unrepentant slaughterers of God's
children."29
The Nuremberg Files Web site provided de facto instructions for those
seeking to injure or murder the doctors listed.26 The Web site contained
the home and work addresses and phone numbers for the doctors, as well
as recent photographs.261 The Web site further supplied intimate family
information, such as the spouse's name, 62 and useful data for someone
seeking to harm a doctor's loved ones. Of even greater concern, the Web
site encouraged readers to contact these doctors.2 63  For example,
underneath the personal information of Dr. Warren Hern, a plaintiff in
the lawsuit, the following statement appears: "You might want to share
your point of view with this 'doctor.'" 2
Even more disturbing, however, is the evidence suggesting that the
operators of the Nuremberg Files Web site intended to incite violence
toward abortion providers. When three doctors on the list were killed
their names were promptly crossed off like items on a grocery list.65
Similarly, when a doctor was injured, the operators would print the name
in gray.2' 6  By not only listing personal contact information about
abortion providers, but also indicating when these persons were injured
or killed, the Web site clearly seems to aspire to guide individuals
intending to harm abortion providers.
257. See Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Oregon, at 9,
Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Williamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists,
23 F. Supp. 2d 1182,1185 (D. Ore. 1998).








265. Soteropoulos, supra note 151, at 12; Carol Ness, More Abortion Violence Is
Feared in Light of Trophy List on Foes' Internet Site, DETROIT NEWS, Nov. 15, 1999;
Associated Press, Jury to be Selected in Suit Against Antiabortion Web Site, BOSTON
GLOBE, Jan. 7, 1999, at All.
266. Jury to be Selected, supra note 265.
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Therefore, although the Nuremberg Files Web site addressed an
important political topic, it is harmful to the abortion debate. Instead of
offering constructive contributions to the debate, the Web site more
likely intimidates opponents and silences debate. The Web site
maintains a threatening tone throughout, and the effects of this
intimidation are felt by the abortion providers who, after seeing their
colleagues injured or killed, are forced to take precautionary measures
for their own safety.
3. Likely Audience
The Brandenburg standard carefully evaluates the context in which the
message was delivered to determine the likelihood of incitement to
imminent, lawless action. This consideration of context was one of the
major developments from Judge Hand's incitement standard in Masses.2 67
Identical words, delivered in different situations, yield varied risks of
incitement. As Kalven observed, courts should "read the message as a
whole, and.., develop sensitivity in reading the metaphors of violence
which are frequent in radical rhetoric."26
An important consideration when considering context is the audience
of the message. Hess held that incitement must be directed at an
audience.69 Although identifying the specific audience in cyberspace is
often infeasible, it is possible to anticipate the likely audience of Internet
messages. The identification of the likely audience enables a court to
assess the likelihood of incitement. Under traditional applications of the
incitement standard the audience is obvious. The individuals who
attended the rally or demonstration were the ones who heard the
message. If incitement were to occur, these individuals would be the one
incited. The Internet incitement test, therefore, must compensate for the
less transparent speaker-audience relationship that exists in cyberspace.
In many cases it is impossible to know with certainty who will receive a
message once it is posted on the Internet. For certain Internet
communications, the potential audience is endless. Anyone, across the
world, with access to the Internet can view most Web sites and can join
most discussion groups.7 It is clear, however, that certain individuals are
more likely to visit a particular Web site or join a specific discussion
group than others. For example, the creator of a Web site or discussion
267. Masses Publ'n Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 246 F.24 (2d Cir.
1917); see also text accompanying supra note 112.
268. KALVEN, supra note 20, at 121.
269. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105,108-09 (1973).
270. See supra note 5.
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group often has an eye on a particular audience. Similarly, an individual
who accesses a particular Web site or joins a discussion group often
possesses an interest in that subject matter. For example, individuals
often employ search engines to find particular Web sites.271 To activate
these search engines, the user must input key words for the search, and,
within seconds, Web sites matching those keywords are displayed.
Therefore, a Web site will acquire an audience composed of individuals
272with a strong interest in its content.
Upon identifying the most probable audience of an Internet message, a
court can garner insight into the likelihood of incitement. One Web site
might attract a predominantly pacifist audience, while another might
attract a more aggressive and violent audience. Naturally, incitement is
far more likely to result from the latter audience. Similarly, once a court
identifies the likely audience, the court can assess how impressionable
the speaker's words will be to its listeners. A younger audience may be
more impressionable than a more mature audience. Similarly, a more
educated audience may be better equipped to resist the temptation of
incitement.
A political Web site, such as the Nuremberg Files Web site, will
naturally attract persons with intense convictions on the abortion debate.
In the abortion debate, the individuals with strong convictions tend to
fall into certain categories. Most of these individuals are peaceful,
expressing their actions through attending pro-life marches, picketing
outside clinics, or volunteering at pregnancy counseling centers.273 These
individuals prefer nonviolent expressions of their views and understand
the benefits of peaceful, civilized debate. Others, however, favor
violence. Among this latter group are individuals likely to deem the
murder of abortion providers as an appropriate solution.
Although the group that favors violence constitutes a relatively small
segment of pro-life activists, the group nonetheless exists. Moreover,
considering the colossal number of users on the Internet,274 the chance
that an extremist with violent tendencies will visit the Web site is
significant. In fact, these extremists are probably most likely to find the
271. See NEWTON, NEWTON'S TELECOM DICTIONARY 610 (17th ed. 2001).
272. See id.
273. The Pennsylvania Pro-Life Federation, for example, has consistently condemned
violence against individuals who perform abortions, and has criticized the killing of Dr.
Bernard Slepian. See Shirley Geoghan, President Pennsylvania Pro-Life Federation,
Letter to the Editor, Speaking in Favor of Pro-life Doesn't Cause Violence, PATRIOT-
NEWS HARRISBURG, Nov. 1, 1998, at B12.
274. The most recent count estimates that approximately 200 million persons
worldwide access the Internet. See Hogan, supra note 4, at 432.
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Nuremberg Files Web site. For example, a person who had entered the
inflammatory phrases, "baby butchers," "kill God's little babies,"
"slaughtered babies," and "wanton slaughter of God's children," into a
search engine would have found the Nuremberg Files Web site.275
For the commercial terrorism Web sites, however, the audience is
more difficult to predict. The most likely audience would be "hackers"
and other individuals who have acquired computer expertise because
many of the articles deal with computer hacking. 276 These Web sites
would also attract a wide range of individuals who are looking for
comedy on the Internet. As a result, there is a clear contrast between
Web sites that advocate commercial terrorism through a comical tone
and politically volatile Web sites like the Nuremberg Files Web site.
With most commercial terrorism Web sites, the audience is not only
more difficult to define, but also is more likely to be composed of
individuals who perceive the Web site as humor and not a call for
violence.
4. Nature of the Issue Involved
A court's inquiry also must look at the nature of the issue around
which the alleged incitement revolves. Certain issues or controversies
conjure stronger and more impassioned emotions than others. Just as a
fiery speech at an anti-war demonstration is more likely to incite lawless
action than one at a religious rally, Internet postings on different topics
have varied effects. If it is a political debate, what is the tone of the
debate? Is it a debate that has been characterized by violence?
There is no doubt that abortion is one of the most divisive issues of our
time."7 Like many intense political debates, the abortion debate has
275. All these words were used on the first page of the Nuremberg Files Web site.
Therefore, a search using those words would likely result in finding the Nuremberg Files
Web site. See The Nuremberg Files, at http://209.41.174.82/atrocity/index.htmi (last visited
Nov. 7,2001).
276. See, e.g., The Mentor, A Novice's Guide to Hacking-1989 Edition, 4 PHRACK
INC. MAG. at http://www.phrack.org/show.php?p=22&a=4; The Gatsby, A Hacker's Guide
to the Internet, 3 PHRACK INC. MAG. 33 (Sept. 15, 1991, at http://www.
phrack.com/show.php?p=33&a=3; Black Knight from 713, Hacking Voice Mail Systems, 4
PHRACK INC. MAG., 11 (Feb. 17, 1987), at http://www.phrack.org/show.php?p=ll&a=4;
see also Introduction, 1 PHRACK INC. MAG. 1, at http://www.phrack.com/org/
show.php?p=l&a=l (providing an overview of the subject matter of Phrack Magazine).
277. See, e.g., DONALD P. JUDGES, HARD CHOICES, LOST VOICES 4 (1993)
(describing abortion as one of the most divisive issues of our day, with some persons
viewing abortion as a slaughter and others as a test of society's commitment to individual
liberty, personal autonomy, and women's welfare); Allen Buchanan, Ethical
Responsibilities of Patients and Clinical Geneticists, I J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 391,
393 (1998) (identifying the morality of abortion as "one of the most divisive issues our
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found a home in cyberspace, as evidenced by the countless newsgroups,
listservs, and Web sites championing pro-life and pro-choice positions. 278
Abortion has not only emerged as one of the most controversial debates
in society today, but also as one of the most violent.279 This propensity
toward violence is particularly prevalent amongst anti-abortion
extremists who believe that abortion providers should be harmed or
killed for their sins.8' Since 1993, seven United States abortion clinic
workers, including three doctors, have been murdered, according to the
National Abortion Federation, an abortion-rights group.81 The National
Abortion Federation believes that anti-abortion extremists have been
responsible for thirty-nine bombings, ninety-nine acid attacks, and
sixteen attempted murders.m Similar violence has occurred in Canada
when three doctors were injured in their homes by sniper fire."3
Of even greater concern, certain abortion providers listed on the
Nuremberg Files Web site have been victims of the volatile abortion
debate.2" Although the Web site was only posted for about a year, three
society has known"). For example, a 1998 poll revealed that forty percent of Americans
would not vote for a candidate who had different views on abortion. Michael Griffin, 2
Issues Heat up Governor's Race Poll: Vouchers, Abortion Divide Voters, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, July 23, 1998, at DI (reporting poll data indicating forty-three percent of
potential voters considered abortion to be a "very important" issue in the Florida 1998
governor's election).
278. See, e.g., National Abortion and Reproductive Action League (NARAL), at
http://www.naral.org (last visited Oct 29, 2001); People for Life, at http://www.
peopleforlife.org (last visited Oct. 26, 2001); Pro-Woman, Pro-Life, at http://www.
gargaro.com/noabort.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2000).
279. For a comprehensive discussion of recent violence against abortion providers, see
Amicus Brief of ACLU at 3-6, Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v.
Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (D. Or. 1998) (95-1671-10).
280. For example, the American Coalition of Life Activists (ACLA), a defendant in
the law suit, was created in 1994 as a result of a split in the anti-abortion movement over
the controversy surrounding "justifiable homicide" of abortion providers. A number of
anti-abortion activists left "Operation Rescue" to form the ACLA as an organization of
individuals who believed that violence, including murder, against abortion providers was
legally, morally, or religiously justifiable. See id. at 5 (citing Plaintiffs' Memorandum, at
10-11).
Although violence initiated by anti-abortion extremists gains most of the headlines,
pro-choice activists have been accused of resorting to violence as well. See Pro-Abortion
Violence, at http://www.mttu.com/proabort-violence.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2000).
281. See Varner, supra note 150, at 14A.
282. See Lafferty, supra note 159, at 14. In January 1997, for example, an abortion
clinic in Birmingham, Alabama was bombed, killing an off-duty police officer and
maiming a nurse. See Judy L. Thomas, Area Doctor Pressing Abortion Lawsuit. He'll Join
Others Around the Country Trying to Rein in Militant Opponents, KANSAS CITY STAR,
Jan. 4, 1999, at B1.
283. See Varner, supra note 150, at 14A.
284. See Mandel, supra note 152.
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doctors listed on the Web site were eventually killed78 Perhaps most
well-documented was the recent murder of Dr. Bernard Slepian, a
Buffalo abortion provider who was slain in his kitchen by a sniper's
bullet on October 23, 1998.2
As a result, many abortion providers live in fear. They and other
abortion clinic employees are escorted by guards to and from cars, some
wear bullet-proof vests and carry firearms, and many of their homes are
equipped with bulletproof windowsi' In fact, recently the National
Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League issued a new alert to
clinics nationwide, urging doctors to wear bulletproof vests, to routinely
change their driving routes, and to avoid leaving or entering their homes
after dark."
On the other hand, the issues targeted by Phrack and other
commercial terrorism Web sites are far less contentious., 9 Frustration
toward McDonald's and 7-Eleven does not invoke the impassioned
activism and routine violence that the abortion issue does. Therefore,
the danger that the nature of the issue will lead to incitement is much
smaller with commercial terrorism Web sites than with political Web
sites such as the Nuremberg Files Web site.
C. Evaluating Internet Incitement Under this Framework
Combined, these four considerations craft a framework for assessing
Brandenburg's incitement standard on the Internet. The amalgamation
of these factors would enable a court to consider an Internet statement in
its entirety and competently assess whether it constitutes "advocacy...
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action."2'9
If this analysis is used on the potential instances of Internet incitement
discussed in this Article, it seems that the Nuremberg Files Web site
poses a far greater danger than the commercial terrorism Web sites. In
fact, it seems likely that the Nuremberg Files Web site reaches a
sufficiently egregious level to justify censorship, even under the rigorous
285. Id.
286. See Brad Knickerbocker, Anti-Abortion Web Sites: Free Speech or 'Threats'?
Oregon Case Examines Impact of Publicizing Information About Doctors, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, Jan. 12, 1999, at 1; Varner, supra note 150, at 14A.
287. See, e.g., Baca, supra note 254, at 6A (describing life of abortion provider, Dr.
Mildren Hansen); Varner, supra note 150, at 14A.
288. See Varner, supra note 150, at 14A.
289. Charlie X, Screwing Over Your Local McDonalds, 45 PHRACK INC. MAO. 19
(Mar. 30, 1994) at http://www.phrack.org/show.php?p=45&9=19.
290. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
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Brandenburg standard. Because violence toward an abortion provider
would undoubtedly constitute lawless action, the essential question asks
whether the incitement is likely to occur and whether it would be
imminent. The suggested factors answer this inquiry.
If a violent extremist accessed the Nuremberg Files Web site, the
danger of incitement would be great. Given the enormous number of
Internet users and the volatile nature of the abortion debate, it is
probable that many violent extremists viewed the Web site when it was
operating. The extremist saw a Web site with "baby butchers" as a
heading, saw blood dripping down the page, and viewed the names,
addresses, and photographs of these "butchers." 291 If the individual
viewing of this page already possessed a strong loathing for these doctors
and deemed violence as the appropriate solution, and if the individual
had any penchant towards committing violence against these abortion
providers, the Web site may incite that violence. Furthermore, the de
facto instructions for injuring abortion providers listed on the Web site,
such as the personal information including home and office addresses,
facilitate the execution of this lawless activity. As a result, under the
scrutiny proposed by this Article, the Nuremberg Files Web site would
not receive constitutional protection.
The commercial terrorism Web sites, however, are less likely to reach
the high level of dangerousness that would justify censorship under
Brandenburg. First, the audience of these Web sites is far more difficult
to define than the audience of the Nuremberg Files Web site. Unlike the
Nuremberg Files Web site, which is likely to attract certain types of
viewers, the range of people who would read Phrack and other
commercial terrorism Web sites seems endless. Moreover, although
these Web sites present words that encourage lawless activity, they do so
in a comical manner that is unlikely to be taken seriously. The tone of
Phrack is one of humor, in contrast to the morbid and intimidating tone
of the Nuremberg Files Web site. Lastly, commercial terrorism Web
sites tend to involve issues that are not inherently violent. Aggression
toward McDonald's employees has not been nearly as rampant as
violence toward abortion providers. For these reasons, it seems doubtful
that commercial terrorism Web sites, such as those discussed in this
Article, would constitute incitement outside the safeguards of the First
Amendment.
291. The Nuremberg Files, at http://209.41.174.82/atrocity (last visited Nov. 5, 2001).
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CONCLUSION
Internet incitement is very real, as is the danger of violence
surrounding many issues discussed in cyberspace. This hazard was
confirmed as recently as October 23, 1998, when Dr. Bernard Slepian, an
abortion provider whose personal information was listed on the
Nuremberg Files Web site, was brutally murdered in his Buffalo home.29
The nature of the Internet makes the opportunity for unlawful
incitement greater. Operators of websites such as the Nuremberg Files
Web site and Phrack possess newfound power to reach an enormous
audience to present messages of incitement. Many members of this
audience are highly impressionable and, depending on the nature of the
issue and the content of the message, could very well be incited to
unlawful action.
Judicial applications of the Brandenburg standard have succeeded in
striking the appropriate balance between free speech and ordered society
for traditional forms of incitement. In the twenty-first century, however,
incitement is not only possible on street corners and at political rallies.
Individuals wishing to present inciting messages now have new avenues
for communication in cyberspace. The Internet is no less dangerous and
no more worthy of constitutional protection than a speaker who incites a
riotous crowd to vandalize the streets or attack police officers. The
difference, however, is that incitement over the Internet is often more
difficult to assess. The unique speaker-audience relationship in
cyberspace requires courts to clarify the imminence requirement and to
devise an incitement standard that meets the new demands of the
Internet. If done carefully and wisely, it is possible to construct a
standard that addresses the dangers of Internet incitement while
remaining faithful to Brandenburg's steadfast commitment to free
speech.
292. See Knickerbocker, supra note 286.
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